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Perverting Evolutionary Narratives Of 
Heterosexual Masculinity 





Abstract: Focuses on the characters of evolutionary stories about male sexuality. 




INTRODUCTION: HOW TO PERVERT EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
Anyone questioning the natural and therefore privileged status of heterosexuality 
today is likely to meet up with an evolutionary narrative: “After all, 
how could the human species have survived without heterosexuality?” Popular 
American cultural knowledge about heterosexual masculinity is increasingly 
informed by evolutionary accounts of human “nature” that are generated 
formally by scientists and then passed along in the popular press.1 
These evolutionary narratives-representations of the “reality” of masculinity 
based on a neo-Darwinian theory-provide a framework for making heterosexual 
behaviors seem more legitimate (more “natural”) than others. Paradoxically, 
the prevailing commitment to heterosexuality serves as the 
framework for the interpretation of our evolutionary history. Evolutionary 
justifications for the dominant status of heterosexuality have nearly replaced, 
or perhaps extended, Judeo-Christian ones.2 
 
Evolutionary theories, as scientific stories of the biological origin of species, 
harness an imaginary past and in so doing specify “natural” aspects of 
contemporary human sexuality-“perversions” of which can be theorized, 
condemned, or mocked by those who consider themselves properly and primally 
heterosexual. Since sex, in the essentialist discourse of modernism, has 
been thought of as a natural essence geared toward reproduction, sexual acts 
that do not lead to or imitate reproduction (e.g., masturbation, cunnilingus, 
anal intercourse, sadomasochistic sex) have been considered abnormal and 
unnatural,” and, by close association of the “natural” with the morally 
acceptable, immoral.  
 
Although falsely impartial, absolutist frameworks are not necessary for 
determining the legitimacy of various behaviors, we all need contingent frameworks 
to argue for or against any practice (Smith). That we need such 
frameworks is not the problem. The problem is that science has not been an 
explicitly political discourse, and enjoys a discursive position as absolute 
authority, as though “objective” knowledge exists and scientific knowledge is 
it. For example, such presumably neutral knowledge is often invoked to settle 
political disputes authoritatively, like whether homosexuality is a crime or a 
psychological disorder.3 Revolutionary narratives persistently appear in popular 
American cultural texts and have tremendous appeal in a Judeo- 
Christian foundationalist culture that tends to justify heterosexual privilege 
by appealing to falsely impartial scientific versions of nature. 
 
Evolutionary science is far from impartial, however; at present an ideology 
of heterosexism colors it. Heterosexism is then perpetuated, in a vicious 
circle, through its grounding in scientific stories whose authority depends 
upon a refusal to acknowledge their implication in ideology and politics. 
Scientists do not think that the evolutionary past that they construct is imaginary. 
They think they have evidence that supports their construction of our 
past. This evidence, however, is interpreted through an unacknowledged 
heterocentrist framework. 
 
My assumption is not that evolutionary theories are heterosexist and bad 
because they (mis-)interpret nature (what some feminists might claim); nor 
that evolutionary theories make what is really cultural out to be what is 
natural (what some social constructionists might claim); nor that feminists 
and queers just don’t like to admit what evolutionary theories innocently 
reveal (what some evolutionary theorists might claim). All of these statements 
assume that science is necessarily at odds with constructionism, or that evolutionary 
theory is necessarily at odds with feminist and queer theories. It is 
my aim here to undermine the evolutionary naturalization of heterosexuality, 
but not by arguing that evolutionary theory itself is the enemy. Such an 
approach would conflate the heterosexist background assumptions in evolutionary 
narratives with the logic of evolution itself, and ignore the highly 
consequential character of scientific stories. Nor do I pervert evolutionary 
narratives of heterosexual masculinity by advancing some indisputable 
“truth” of humanity’s queer evolutionary history, an approach that would 
affirm, rather than undermine, the naturalization of identities and the authority 
of science to settle political disputes. 
 
I want to expose the values behind heterosexist scientific accounts-to 
replace them not with an impossibly value-neutral account but, rather, with 
an equally sensible evolutionary theory laden with values accountable to 
queers. As Seidman puts it, science is “a powerful practical-moral force” 
(181). I engage evolutionary stories not to offer the final truth of our evolutionary 
history, to biologize even more identities, to stabilize identity itself, 
or to undermine heterosexism through my own infeasibly detached account 
of nature. Rather, I offer an alternative story that could function as a different, 
equally plausible consequential evolutionary myth. This myth, unlike 
the more popular heterosexist one whose consequence is to naturalize heterosexual 
manhood, might make heterosexuality seem less instinctual. This in 
turn might pave the way for greater tolerance of queers, of the instability of 
identities, and, more generally, of the instability of knowledge about those 
identities. 
 
Scientific storytelling is a consequential political practice. A queer reading 
of evolution might interrupt the highly consequential scientific discourses of 
heterosexual manhood. The idea of, and compulsion to live out, “manhood” 
as a natural category that is essentially heterosexual has rationalized and 
enabled a whole host of social ills, notably queer bashing and rape.4 But the 
evolutionary record is not as straight as many think. There is more than one 
meaning to assign to various species’ sexual behaviors, and more than one way 
to imagine the evolutionary history of homo sapiens. A queer evolutionary 
story might be an effective way to expose now-current evolutionary stories as 
heterosexist and challenge the social ills that those stories help legitimate. 
This intervention proceeds from two related axioms: first, from feminist 
critiques of science, that the generation of scientific knowledge is always a 
value-laden cultural practice, usually containing unquestioned heterosexist 
assumptions that naturalize gender and sexuality;5 and second, from queer 
theory, that cultural texts-in this case scientific texts-can be read as queer, 
and further, that these queer meanings are no more or less value-laden than 
the straight meanings already associated with them.6 “Queering” evolutionary 
theory involves offering a new scientific story in a way that exposes the 
political character of all knowledge claims. Insisting upon the legitimacy of 
another, queer narrative calls into question not only the hegemonic narrative 
but the stable, “objective” status of identities and scientific representations 
more generally. 
 
Several pro-gay scientists (Bailey and Pillard; Hamer and Copeland; LeVay) 
have suggested that homosexuality is linked to biology. Although the idea of a 
gay gene” or a “gay brain” might appeal to many who have been expected to 
simply “unlearn” their deviant sexuality, and to many who have justified 
discriminatory practices on the grounds that homosexuality is “unnatural,” 
such an approach leaves in place, and even cements, the status of heterosexuality 
as natural and normative and, further, the status of scientific stories as 
value-neutral accounts of human nature. I want to offer a strategy that takes 
heterosexuality out of its privileged position as natural and grounded in 
human evolutionary history. 
 
I consider the ways in which the increasingly popular sociobiological discourse 
on the sexual practices of insects, birds, and mammals enables the 
construction of naturalized heterosexual masculine identities. In order to convey the  
consequential character of evolutionary stories about male sexuality, 
and the political urgency of alternative consequential accounts, I provide 
several examples of the ways that evolutionary theories explaining male 
sexuality get taken up in the popular press. I then argue, without wishing to 
impute conspiracy or stupidity, that heterosexist background assumptions 
(including an unexamined commitment to heterosexuality as a privileged institution 
and identity) in evolutionary theoretical interpretation reinscribe 
evolutionary stories within a heterosexual logic. After that, I employ evolutionary 
theory with a homophilic rather than homophobic set of background 
assumptions in order to show that the theory of evolution could undermine as 
easily as it has enabled the privileged status of heterosexual relationships and 
sex acts. By exposing the heterosexist assumptions in theoretical and popular 
interpretations of evolution, I present evidence of the inescapably political 
character of scientific stories7 and thus of the ease with which any political 
claim can be justified by “nature,” and, further, of the ensuing impossibility 
of securing any political rights in “nature.” Thus I argue that biological 
theories of the “gay brain” or “gay gene” do not feasibly secure gay rights 
precisely because of the inevitably political character of all scientific accounts 
of nature, and because those theories fail to dislodge heterosexuality 
from its position as biologically normative and scientific stories of nature 
from their position as value-free. I suggest that exposing the political character 
of falsely naturalized accounts of heterosexual male desire is a more 
promising strategy for undermining heterosexist knowledge. 
 
EVOLUTION AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY ARE ALREADY PERVERTED 
Contemporary sexual and gender identities are increasingly wrapped up in a 
popular Darwinian discourse. For instance, in an interview for a public 
television series, men’s-movement figurehead Robert Bly invokes the evolutionary 
narrative of man the hunter to explain male grief. This presumably 
primeval role has influenced the male “collective unconscious.” Male grief is 
thus caused by men’s evolutionary past, as Bly put it, “when men were 
hunters and killed all those animals.” So compelling is the evolutionary myth 
of “man the hunter” that the obvious fact that Americans slaughter countless 
animals today without hunting and without apparent grief is overlooked. An 
article in Men’s Fitness magazine uses the “man the hunter” story to excuse 
men’s inexpressiveness (Cary). Men went off together away from women to 
strategize about hunting, and this process evidently requires little emotional 
expression, which is why women today can expect men to withdraw from 
rather than talk with them during a conflict. Further, the article explains, 
men’s contemporary social positions, themselves presumably extensions of 
manly hunting careers, demand being out of touch with one’s feelings. (The  
article asks readers, rhetorically, to imagine what being in touch with one’s 
feelings would be like while attending to people in an emergency room or 
building a skyscraper.) Thus we are told: “If you trace male behavior back 
40,000 years to the cave, it’s easier to see why men are the way they are” 
(Cary 67). 
 
Before criticizing specific evolutionary accounts, I want to review, for 
those less familiar with it, the Darwinian logic of differential sexual psychologies. 
Evolution by natural selection is Darwin’s theory that variations that 
inhibit an individual’s ability to survive to maturity and reproduce will be 
eliminated.8 For example, giraffes with slightly longer necks will survive a 
“hostile environment’’ of tall trees, reproduce more giraffes with slightly 
longer necks, and so on, gradually eliminating variation in giraffe neck length. 
“All species overproduce offspring, not all of which can survive to reproduce 
in their turn. Thus, there is inevitable competition among the individuals of 
each species for the means to survive and reproduce, and any inherited 
advantage in this competition will be naturally selected” (Daly and Wilson 6, 
authors’ italics). Natural selection works on phenotypes (developmental potentials 
of genes, appearing as actual traits of organisms in a given environment), 
but the evolutionary change is transmitted by surviving genes, which 
are situated on chromosomes. 
 
An adaptation is that which is brought about by differentials among alternative 
forms, the relative advantage of the feature vis-i-vis its alternative 
forms playing a significant causal role in its production (Symons). Some 
things that people do are evolved traits that were put into humans’ nature 
because at one point, in the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (the 
hunting-and-gathering part of our human history, which ended roughly 
10,000 years ago with the spread of agriculture [Wilson 871; hereafter 
“EEA”), those who had that trait passed on their genes more often. In other 
words, some physical traits and psychological mechanisms, whether or not 
they contribute to reproductive success now, are adaptations. “Human nature,” 
then, is that hodgepodge of adaptations geared toward an Ice Age 
hunter-gatherer environment that no longer exists (Wilson 196). These adaptations 
have nothing to do with morality, and may be seen as thoroughly 
corrupt from various political standpoint.9 
 
Sexual reproduction enables gene recombination and thus provides greater 
genetic variety for adaptiveness in a hostile environment. The fact that 
humans are a sexually reproducing species, for evolutionary theorists, implies 
the evolution of two distinct (male and female) human natures or sexual 
psychologies. The fact that men have many small sperm, while women have 
few large ovaries, means that women’s parental investment is much greater 
than men’s: only women can gestate, bear, and nurse the young. In the 
absence of technology allowing otherwise (e.g., in the EEA), reproduction is 
“cheap” for men and “costly” for women. The body design that forced our 
foresisters to invest ovulation, gestation, and lactation time caused in them 
greater coyness. Our forebrothers, on the other hand, were not forced by 
their bodily design to invest much of anything and thus could copulate as 
often as they desired with little physical cost. Evolutionary theorists reason 
that men’s great number of sperm makes them perpetually sexually interested 
and carefree. Choosy females were thus a limiting resource for which men 
competed against one another (Buss; Daly and Wilson; Symons; Wilson). 
That such an evolutionary account of heterosexual male desire has captured 
the popular imagination is obvious in the 1992 Hollywood comedy 
Encino Man, featuring an iced-over caveman who is unearthed and thawed 
out by two male high school students in Encino, California. Perhaps representing 
the modern young men’s lost (or future) unrestrained masculine 
(hetero)sexuality, Encino man sniffs out and makes a beeline for an unacquainted 
young female beauty, climbing over various technological obstacles 
as if they were trees. The film ends with Encino Man’s downward spiral in 
contemporary California, conceivably revealing human nature to be better 
suited for life outdoors around a fire, where our hero eventually winds up, 
with his recently defrosted cave-wife. 
 
A recent issue of Muscle and Fitness magazine features an article entitled 
“Man the Visual Animal” and uses a theory of the evolved difference between 
human male and female sexual psychologies developed by leading evolutionary 
psychologist Donald Symons to explain why men leer at women. 
Ironically, the magazine cover entices readers with “Why Women Lust after 
Muscular Men.” Unfortunately (or fortunately?) for the male bodybuilders 
reading Muscle and Fitness, they learn that women have evolved not to give a 
damn about the size or shape of men’s bodies. Under the subheading “EvoIution 
Happens,” the author explains, 
 
Not much has changed in human sexuality since the Pleistocene. In his 
landmark book The Evolution of Human Sexuality (Oxford University 
Press, 1979), Symons hypothesizes that the male’s sexual response to 
visual cues has been so rewarded by evolution that it’s become innate. 
(Strote 166)10 
 
Such stories provide a means by which heterosexual male readers can 
experience their sexuality as acultural, primal: “The desire to ogle is your 
biological destiny” (Strote 166). Evolution may “happen,” or may have happened, 
but these stories do not just happen. Their appeal, however, seems to 
lie precisely in the sense of security provided by the imagined inevitability of 
heterosexual manhood. 
 
One year after prominent sociobiologist David Barash published his now 
well known 1977 article in Science on the sociobiology of rape in mallards, he 
published a more general evolutionary adaptationist view of the mating practices 
of various birds in Psychology Today, mentioning the significance of 
sociobiology for the study of human beings. Editors at Playboy eventually 
saw this and featured an article entitled “Darwin and the Double Standard,” 
with this lead-in: “It has been said that a man will try to make it with 
anything that moves-and a woman won’t. Now the startling new science 
of sociobiology tells us why” (Morris 109). While providing a vocabulary of 
motive for adulterous heterosexual male readers, this article’s parodic style 
so thoroughly enmeshes human values with accounts of what’s going on in 
nature” that the possibility of using evolution as an unproblematic foundation 
to justify or condemn a sexual practice becomes difficult. There are so 
many different mating habits-such as the female praying mantis’s habit of 
beheading and eating the male while he mounts her, or the female California 
seagull’s habit of bonding with another female, mounting and being mounted 
by her, hatching eggs together with her, and using the male gull only for 
fertilization-that the story could justify any reader’s “perversion.” 
 
Playboy’s lampoonish elucidation of evolved mating habits illustrates what 
people inevitably do with scientific renderings of ‘hature”: alloy them with 
their values and visions of social life. For instance, Morris explains the California 
seagull this way: 
 
JONATHAN LIVINGSTON LESBIAN 
California lady gulls are A.C.D.C. When there aren’t enough males to 
go around, females pair up with each other. One even becomes a bull 
dyke: She mounts the other, defends the nest and does courtship feeding 
just like a male normally would. (No, she doesn’t get a short haircut!) 
These “odd couples” lay eggs and sometimes they even hatch! Virgin 
births? Hardly, It seems that there are lecherous males about who, 
though happily married, are not averse to a bit on the side. And, we’re 
happy to report, our gay females are easily beguiled into accepting even 
a one-night stand. That way, they get to have some offspring and each 
other, too. (110) 
 
Morris writes of wild turkeys: 
CRUISING 
Male wild turkeys travel in pairs. They both cooperate in dancing about 
to impress the lady turkeys, but when it’s actually time to screw, one of 
the males consistently lets the other do it all. What’s going on here? The 
association between males clearly benefits the one who gets to do all the 
mating, but what’s in it for the subordinate Alphonse? Is he really a 
turkey? In fact, he is often Gaston’s brother, so, though not a father, he 
is at least guaranteed being an uncle to milady’s chicks. (111) 
 
While quite heterosexist, these anecdotes frolic in the value-laden character 
of nature stories. Morris’s style winds up using scientific theories less than 
satirizing them. 
 
A parallel queer (sub)version of evolutionary theory is possible (something 
I attempt later in this essay), but mating stories usually become reinscribed 
in a heterosexist language, presupposing and reinforcing a paradigmatically 
heterosexual position. The cover story of the January 20, 1992, issue of 
Time, “Why Are Men and Women Different?” is illustrative. The article 
includes a section called “HOW Other Species Do It” and explains that “nature 
follows more than one script” (Gorman 48). Just after mentioning that 
some species do not even have two sexes, Gorman explains one such species, 
cichlids, this way: 
 
These fish come in three sexes: brightly hued macho males, paler females, 
and male wimps that look and act like females. There are only a 
few sexually active males in a school. But the minute a piscine Lothario 
dies, an ambitious wimp rises to the occasion. His brain unleashes sex 
hormones that bring color to his scales and make him feisty, but he can 
revert to pallid impotence if challenged by a more macho fish. (48) 
 
Gorman’s description for Time fails to escape a male/female conceptual framework. 
The third sex can only be called “male wimps that look and act like 
females.” This language also takes male cichlids who are attracted to or 
actively seek breeding opportunities with females to be the norm, and the 
more flexible fish to be odd. This story of the cichlid preserves precisely what 
another description of the cichlid could call into question: our criteria for 
gender assignment. This account, like those in the popular men’s magazines 
and the less widely read scientific journals, is brimming with the values and 
discursive categories of a heterosexist patriarchal culture. 
 
A privileged, naturalized heterosexuality-with its concurrent masculine 
and feminine dispositions, which make up an auspicious nuclear family unitis 
an implicit part of the framework for sociobiological interpretation and its 
reiterations in the popular press. Commonly held assumptions about gender 
and sexuality make up a strong conceptual filter through which scientific 
evidence is understood.11 This filter, especially when ignored, prevents data 
that might be taken as evidence that contradicts the privileged status of 
heterosexuality from being seen as such. For example, Time explains men’s 
better scores on tests that require three-dimensional thought by emphasizing 
“ancient evolutionary pressures related to hunting, which requires orienting 
 
oneself while pursuing prey” (Gorman 45). Women’s better scores on tests 
which require remembering locations of objects are explained by “evolutionary 
pressure on generations of women who foraged for their food. Foragers 
must recall complex patterns formed of apparently unconnected items” (Gorman 
45). “Orienting oneself” and “recalling complex patterns” are vague 
enough so that, if the gendered patterns in test scores were reversed, it could 
be assumed that men needed to “recall complex patterns” for hunting and 
women needed to “orient themselves” while foraging. The point is that data 
are not used to question the assumed man-the-hunter and woman-the-gatherer 
scenario. As Longino has pointed out, the values in scientific inquiry 
influence the hypotheses for which the data are taken as evidence. Time’s 
evolutionary account of current Western gender differences in test scores 
supports the heterosexist model because it already assumes it. 
 
 
HETEROSEXUAL MASCULINITY AS THE ORIGIN OF THE ORIGINS OF 
HETEROSEXUAL MASCULINITY 
Many evolutionary accounts, without even acknowledging the presence of 
gays and lesbians, focus on characteristics specific to Western heterosexual 
men such as rape and sexual harassment, explaining heterosexual men’s 
behavior toward women as evolved aspects of male sexual psychology. In 
other words, evolutionary theorists take heterosexual male behaviors and 
theorize the circumstances in the EEA for which they, even if in less extreme 
form, would have been beneficial. 
 
For example, evolutionary psychologists Studd and Gattiker argue that 
the prevalence of sexual harassment in organizations is evidence for the 
existence of evolved psychological mechanisms: “[T]he workplace environment 
especially appears to push male behavior toward [the] threshold [for 
coercive sexual behavior] by increasing the opportunity and stimuli for sexual 
advances, and by minimizing the opportunity for recipients of unwanted 
sexual advances to avoid such attention” (287). They claim that their study 
will “further strengthen the validity and extend the domain of the science of 
evolutionary psychology” (287). Strengthening the validity of the idea that 
men’s behavior toward women can be accounted for biologically is their goal; 
the problem of sexual harassment seems secondary, simply the vehicle used 
in a search for man’s true nature. Their justification of their endeavor supposes 
that only such a (presumably) apolitical truth about nature could actually 
provide a solution to social problems anyway.”12 
 
Grounding men’s harassing behavior in evolutionary psychology assumes 
that sexual harassment is rooted in a drive to initiate copulations, when a 
significant amount of harassment goes on without an interest in copulation on 
the part of the harasser and without the result of copulation (e.g., when a 
man is constantly making sexist jokes, hanging photos of naked women, touching 
women, looking down a woman’s blouse, etc.; see MacKinnon). Given their 
assumption that sexual harassment is some sort of courtship behavior, its 
extremely low success rate provides ample reason to wonder how any harassing 
males could have had enough successful breeding opportunities to pass this 
trait on.13 The existence of sexual harassment could be, but never is, taken as 
evidence that heterosexuality is not evolved. But so strong is the heterosexist 
bias that Studd and Gattiker instead theorize that there was probably no 
evolutionary pressure against male “mistakes” of harassment, that is, the initiation 
of sexual contact when a woman is not interested. They explain how 
privileged ignorance is an evolved psychological mechanism in men: 
 
I[f] proceptivity [i.e. showing signs of sexual interest when such interest 
exists] is an evolved part of female sexual psychology, one would expect 
males to have co-evolved psychological mechanisms sensitive to this type 
of female behavior and which motivate the initiation of sexual overtures 
in response. Males in past environments who lacked this psychological 
response would have been selected against by missing limited opportunities 
to pursue matings with interested females. . . . Missing a real opportunity 
for sexual access would be ultimately more costly than occasionally 
misreading signals of female availability. Thus, males may have 
evolved psychological mechanisms that cause them to “deliberately,” 
but unconsciously, misinterpret female signals of friendliness and sociality 
as sexual in nature. (284) 
 
This view posits an imperceptiveness on the part of men. But recall the 
Muscle and Fitness discussion of evolved male tendencies to ogle at women, 
which posits a high degree of male perceptiveness with respect to what women 
look like. Evolutionary theorists reason that men’s great number of sperm 
renders men perpetually in heat, if you will, since for men reproduction is so 
cheap. “A man’s genetic stock went up every time he got a woman pregnant. 
As long as he could do so with low risk and little cost of time or energy, 
natural selection favored (quoting Symons) ‘his tendency to be aroused sexually 
by the sight of women”’ (Strote 168). Further, men are always evaluating 
what women look like, and are attracted to specific types of female appearances, 
namely those that indicate fertility such as “smooth skin, long hair 
and fingernails and white teeth” (Strote 168). Because women with acne, 
short hair, short fingernails and yellowing teeth are not necessarily less fertile, 
and because the converse traits did not necessarily signal fertility in the 
EEA, we could question how men’s apparent ability to make such distinctions 
in women’s appearances could have evolved through natural selection. 
In April 1995, the ABC news program Day One elaborated the theory that 
men naturally are very particular about whom they want to sleep with. 
 
Reporting on evolutionary psychologist David Buss’s new book, The Evolution 
of Desire, the show presents us with supermodel Cindy Crawford and 
Barbie (the doll), who presumably represent what men are wired to find 
desirable. As Buss elaborates in the interview, our evolutionary forebrothers 
who did not prefer women with high cheekbones, big eyes, lustrous hair, and 
full lips did not reproduce. Buss explains that those men who happened to 
like someone who was older, sicker, or infertile “are not our ancestors. We 
are all the descendants of those men who preferred young healthy women 
and so as offspring, as descendants of those men, we carry with us their 
desires.” On that same show, Penthouse magazine publisher Bob Guccioni 
says that men are simply biologically wired to enjoy looking at sexy women: 
“This may be very politically incorrect but that’s the way it is. . . . It’s all 
part of our ancestral conditioning.” 
 
Buss’s view simply assumes that men in the EEA had particular preferences 
for mates, and then mated with only those types of people. In other words, it 
assumes that men who mated with infertile people never.mated with fertile 
people. The theory of sexual harassment based on the assumption that men 
have evolved to read sometimes the nonsexual signals of women as sexual 
works by presuming that the men with less keen sensitivities toward women 
would have had the evolutionary edge. In other words, the sex harassment 
theory reasons that it must have been better for men to just go for it than to 
be cautious about whom they are mating with, while the ogling theory presumes 
that it must have been better to be cautious or choosy about appearances 
than to go for sex with anyone. 
 
Male ogling can be explained evolutionarily only if we assume first that 
men can, or could ever, spot fertility accurately, and second that men who 
had such a keen ability to make such distinctions among women actually had 
more offspring who lived to reproductive age. But if men’s great number of 
sperm make their ejaculations so nugatory, evolution could have conceivably 
favored men who find all women physically appealing or who mate without 
regard to appearance or fertility. There would have been no cost for male 
“mistakes” of ejaculating into infertile bodies, and thus no selective pressure 
against men who did not distinguish between fertile and infertile people.14 
Men who mated licentiously may have wound up with more of their genes in 
the population. The men who mated with both fertile and infertile people 
would have reproduced this “tendency.” Men may not have mated exclusively 
with fertile females, or exclusively with females. Indeed, ancestral men may 
have made no distinction between fertile and infertile females as objects of 
sexual desire; they may have made no distinction between males and females 
as objects of sexual desire. 
 
The behavior of today’s average Western heterosexual man cannot provide 
uncomplicated evidence of a specific evolved sexual psychology or of what the 
 
EEA was like, any more than people’s sugar cravings (whether or not these 
cravings are considered biological) provide evidence that there were candy 
bars in the EEA (a mistake evolutionary theorists make when talking about 
male sexuality, but not when talking about eating sweets).15 If people in the 
EEA were not particularly focused on sex and matings, or if such occasions 
were not readily available to them, then there would not have been any 
selective pressure limiting sexual capacity. Thus men’s current sexual capacities 
do not imply that most men in the EEA sought the sexual attention of 
women specifically or very often, or that doing so would have made one more 
reproductively competitive. Assuming this from any of today’s heterosexual 
male behaviors and/or expressed desires is like assuming that there must 
have been lots of candy in the EEA, that those who ate lots of sweets were 
more reproductively successful, and that the reason we eat sweets today is 
because our ancestors got to eat a lot and it must have been good for them. 
 
Consider the men to whom the Muscle and Fitness article may have been 
speaking. Its suggestion that men are wired to look lustfully, combined with 
the magazine cover that purports to explain “Why Women Lust After Muscular 
Men,” may offer a veiled evolutionary justification for gay male readers 
who lust after or “cruise” muscular men. Evolutionary theorists could admit 
that there are plenty of men who are not particularly interested in women 
sexually and/or who do not express sexual interest as ogling and harassing. 
Deplorable behaviors common among Western heterosexual men, like sexual 
harassment and rape, could be taken as evidence for an entirely different set 
of hypotheses about the sorts of male and female sexual psychologies for 
which there was selective pressure in the EEA. 
 
HOMOSEXUALITY AS HETEROSEXUALITY . . . AS HOMOSEXUALITY 
Another way evolutionary theorists continue to privilege heterosexuality is 
by explaining homosexual behaviors in terms of their breeding potential or 
“adaptive value.” For instance, Barash tells Psychology Today readers how 
rape, even homosexual rape,” is rather common in animals “when fitness 
demands it” (“Sexual Selection” 84). The anthocorid bug “rapist” “forces” 
his sperm into the storage organ of his male “victim,” sometimes while the 
“victim” copulates with a female, so that the “victim” transfers the “aggressor 
bug’s’’ sperm, rather than his own, the next time he copulates with a 
female (who presumably desires such copulations). Barash (“The Sociobiology 
of Rape,” “Sexual Selection”) provides no evidence that such copulations 
are forced, which suggests that he is guided by the heterosexist assumption 
that a manly bug would not allow another male bug to do this to him. Further, 
Barash presents the male bug “rapist” as if he only copulates with other 
males in order to gain indirect access to female bugs. 
 
But when the language that attributes intention to the evolutionary process 
or to individual bugs is suspended, we see that natural selection operated 
in a way that favored the selection of male bugs who go for sex with other 
male bugs or sex in groups. By way of analogy, consider cats as they scratch 
their claws on various objects. While most usually assume that cats are trying 
to “sharpen their claws,” cats scratch at things with little regard to how 
sharp their claws are getting-in fact, a declawed house cat will still “scratch” 
at furniture. Cats have sensitive pads on the bottoms of their paws that, 
when pressure is applied, produce a pleasurable sensation. The cats that felt 
pleasure during acts that wound up sharpening their claws may have been 
favored through natural selection, because they would have had sharper 
claws (enabling them to climb trees, defend themselves, etc.). Thus, cats 
don’t intend to sharpen their claws, and male bugs don’t intend to inseminate 
females (or to “rape” males). The behaviors in question just feel good. 
(Darwinists say that those behaviors in the EEA that helped an individual 
survive and reproduce and that were also pleasurable ensured their enactment.) 
The evolutionary story of anthocorid bugs could make homosexuality 
and other so-called perversions seem more “natural” (and therefore more 
moral, in modernist, foundationalist logic). Instead, however, homosexual 
acts become reinscribed in a heterosexist logic, such that anything homosexual 
must really be for heterosexual/reproductive purposes. 
 
Yet, a scientist might argue, this is simply, innocently, adaptationist logic. 
If something leads to the reproduction of an individual, then those traits will 
eventually be selected for. Everything must ultimately be explained heterosexually, 
if you will, since this is the way the beings in question reproduce 
and traits are selected. However, evolution does not work like an omnipotent 
designer. Evolution is a bunch of “odd arrangements and funny solutions” 
(Gould 20). Evolutionary theorists’ common use of metaphorical shorthand 
(noted by Gould) that imputes conscious action or heterosexual intent to 
genes, natural selection, or individual bugs engaged in “perverted” behavior 
reinforces the heterosexism of the accounts. A logic of reproductive intent 
enables the privileging of heterosexuality, and the social impact of such scientific 
stories serves to make homosexuality “natural” only if it will ultimately 
be properly heterosexualy mating-oriented. But, like the declawed house cat 
“scratching” at the furniture, humans are left behaving in ways that passed 
on our genes in the EEA but now just feel good, and may or may not contribute 
to reproductive success. In other words, ejaculations-heterosexual, 
homosexual, alone or in groups-just feel good. 
 
Even sociobiological explanations of human homosexuality wind up naturalizing 
heterosexuality by holding up homosexuality as a challenge for evolutionary 
theorists to explain-as if the legitimacy of evolutionary theory 
itself depends upon an evolved heterosexual human nature! A common minoritizing 
sociobiological account of human homosexuality assumes that people 
who become gay are from large families and thus can “afford,” in terms 
of their inclusive fitness, to live a life without breeding, since they have so 
many siblings who will be passing on some of their genes (see Wilson 14445). 
However, this is an explanation of leading an exclusively gay lifestyle rather 
than an explanation of homosexual attraction or having homosexual experiences. 
Furthermore, this almost suggests that homosexuality is a choice made 
once one’s siblings are counted, while evolutionary psychology does not assume 
that decisions are made with reproductive success in mind. Evolutionary 
theory can only argue that current decisions are made based on preferences 
that would have contributed to one’s reproductive success back in the 
EEA. Besides, the argument rests on the assumption that those with a heterosexual 
identity reproduce and gays and lesbians do not. (Perhaps even more 
gays and lesbians would have children if heterosexist custody and other laws 
did not discourage them [see Rubinstein] .) Finally, such sociobiological explanations 
of homosexuality marginalize it-and in so doing naturalize heterosexuality- 
by simply assuming that the adaptive value of heterosexuality 
needs no elucidation.l6 
 
Evolutionary psychologists Donald Symons and David Buss both discuss 
gay men, but only to prove the evolutionary roots of heterosexual male attraction. 
They argue that the allegedly gay male emphasis on youth, on 
physical attractiveness, on variation in sexual partners without emotional or 
financial investment, and on genitally and orgasmically focused sex provides 
evidence for the hypothesis that a male sexual psychological nature exists and 
is being played out today. Because they reason that gay men do not have to 
compromise with women’s very different sexual psychological nature (as 
straight men do), Symons and Buss investigate gay male sexuality in order to 
test their evolutionary theory that men who were attracted to reproductively 
healthy, fertile-looking females and copulated with as many of these females 
as possible whenever possible with a minimum of resource investment would 
have had greater reproductive success. In other words, they use gay men as 
“an acid test for the evolutionary basis of sex differences in the desires for a 
mate” (Buss 60). However, so strong is the underlying heterosexist bias that 
both Symons and Buss seem to miss the obvious irony in studying gay men to 
provide evidence for the natural basis of heterosexual men’s desires. 
 
Assuming that the premises of the argument are correct-that the depiction 
of tastes properly represents gay men, and that such tendencies do have 
a biological base-the existence of homosexual men shows that evolution may 
have selected for men who like uncommitted sexual relationships with a variety 
of good-looking young people, which supports the bisexual or gender irrelevant 
hypothesis. Symons and Buss study gay male sexuality, but assume 
that ancestral men sought youth and beauty in women, rather than in men or 
without regard to gender. The unacknowledged commitment to the privileged, 
natural status of heterosexuality precludes taking homosexuality as evidence 
for a hypothesis that ancestral males were bisexual. For these theorists, what 
could be evidence against the naturalness of heterosexuality winds up as 
more evidence for it. 
 
Symons merely remarks that the existence of gays ‘‘attests to the importance 
of social experience in determining the objects that humans sexually 
desire” (304; emphasis mine). Symons does not argue that “social experience” 
is necessary for men to be visually stimulated by and want to copulate 
with a variety of young, beautiful women, now or in the EEA. Buss simply 
dismisses the issue by saying, “The origins of homosexuality remain a mystery” 
(61). For a scholar who makes his living explaining the evolutionary 
basis of current sexual desires, this is a curious omission. 
 
These theoretical attempts take place in a cultural system in which 
homosexuality is silenced, denied, and wished not to exist (Sedgwick). But 
homosexuality is simultaneously necessary for those who define themselves 
against it (Sedgwick), and must be seen either as a problem to be explained in 
evolutionary theory or as some kinky variation that occurs only when certain 
environmental conditions do not allow for heterosexuality, the default mode. 
The continued implication of animals as strategists, despite the fact that 
Darwinian psychology asserts a view of adaptation that does not imply that 
contemporary human action is “rational” in the evolutionary sense, reinforces 
the heterosexist assumption. Although the commitment to heterosexuality 
means that bisexuality is not taken as an hypothesis for which to seek 
evidence, evolutionary theory could legitimate a variety of sexual practices, 
and bisexuality could be considered an adaptation. 
 
SETTING THE EVOLUTIONARY RECORD QUEER 
I have suggested that heterosexual attraction in human beings, and its adaptive 
value, goes unquestioned by evolutionary theorists. Consider, though, 
how easy it is to make a sound evolutionary argument that human bisexuality 
is evolved.17  It is not as though human beings needed to mate exclusively with 
members of the opposite sex in order to survive and reproduce their own 
genes. For example, evolutionary theorists could take the absence of vaginal 
orgasm in women as evidence for the existence of an evolved distaste for men 
or penis-vagina intercourse.18  Women’s capacity for multiple clitoral orgasms 
could indicate that our foresisters may have sought nonpenetrative sexual 
encounters with men and/or women. Since it was to women’s evolutionary 
advantage not to be pregnant all the time, this set of desires could have been 
selected for. Or, it could simply mean that no selective pressure existed to cap 
off female sexual capacity. 
 
Edward Wilson, contemporary figurehead of the sociobiology movement 
and enemy of many progressive academics, notes that the primary function 
of sexual pleasure in human beings is not insemination but bonding. “All that 
we can surmise of humankind’s genetic history argues for a more liberal 
sexual morality, in which sexual practices are to be regarded first as bonding 
devices and only second as means for procreation” (Wilson 142). Wilson, 
however, assumes that men and women bond through sexual relations, 
whereas men bond with men only because women’s year-round sexual “receptivity” 
makes for less competitive relations between men (due to reduced 
competition for sexual access to women; 14142). But why not imagine the 
evolutionary benefits of male-male sexual bonds, and postulate the rich sex 
life that our forebrothers might have had with one another-perhaps while 
away on those hunts? 
 
It is commonly assumed that the men who had a preference for mating with 
women rather than men (assuming that this is something that could have a 
genetic component and that such a genetic variation existed among men in 
the EEA) would have wound up with more offspring, thereby reproducing a 
trait of male sexual attraction to females. But men have so many expendable 
sperm that those who were not partial to either sex may have had less competitive 
relations with other men, and as a result more “breeding opportunities” 
with females. Wilson assumes that if same-gender sexual bonding occurred 
it must have been in a small number of people, reasoning that as long 
as the relatives of a homosexual, who share many of the same genes, were 
reproductively successful, then the homosexual trait would have been passed 
on (14445). This, while more appealing than theories that ignore homosexuality 
altogether, is what Sedgwick might call a minoritizing account of homosexuality.l9  
The status of heterosexuality as innate and naturally statistically 
normative, as a biological-majority orientation, still goes unquestioned. 
 
I want to suggest an account that does not minoritize sexual deviation but 
universalizes it: our ancestors’ matings could have been random with regard 
to genitals. If so, pregnancies would have occurred, babies would have been 
born, and individuals would have passed on their bisexual tendencies. Heterosexuality 
would not have been the dominant orientation with homosexuality 
a deviant variation practiced by a minority (statistical or otherwise). 
Gender categories for sexual practices may not have been as distinct as they 
are today. We simply do not know. The maintenance of a social system in 
which people must identify with one of two distinct sexes is bound up with the 
system of compulsory heterosexuality (see Butler; Dworkin; Rich). 
 
Why don’t evolutionary theorists argue that ancestral males must have 
sought opportunities to copulate with either gender? It would not be unreasonable 
to argue that our heterosexist society-arguably an evolutionarily 
novel environment-inhibits the options for sexual expression. Within the 
terms of evolutionary theory itself, bisexuality could be seen as an adaptation, 
and a society of compulsory heterosexuality as, well, perverted. 
 
DO “GAY BRAINS” MAKE BETTER POLITICS? 
Does this new account of human evolution mean, then, that 10 percent of the 
human population is naturally homosexual? This does not make sense evolutionarily 
(such a homosexual “trait” would never have reproduced itself, nor 
do we have evidence that any, let alone 90 percent of, ancestral males were 
exclusively heterosexual) or sociologically (the categories homosexual and 
heterosexual, and their concomitant personal identities, are recent historical 
constructions [Weeks]). Thus, studies that attempt to legitimate homosexuality 
by grounding it in biology wind up reifying socially constructed identities 
and maintaining naturalized boundaries for identification that may not 
have existed in the human EEA at all. Simon LeVay’s research, touted in the 
media as the “gay brain” study, is worth examining because it represents a 
hopeful attempt to link homosexual desire to biology.20 
 
LeVay suggested that the hypothalamus, a small area over the brain stem 
which he believes regulates male-typical sexual behavior in nonhuman animals, 
might account for differences in sexual preference. LeVay found that 
out of 41 autopsied brains, a small group of cells called the third interstitial 
nucleus of the anterior hypothalamus (or INAH-3) was on average twice as 
large in “heterosexual” men as in either women or “gay” men (Gorman 45; 
LeVay). (The language of size itself might reinforce heterosexist values, construing 
women and gay men as deficient. But is bigger better, or are straight 
men fat-headed?) Even though studies of tropical fish have shown the hypothalamus 
to be something that is not fixed but changes with environmental 
variations (Gorman 48), LeVay mentions only the male rat, whose preoptic 
nucleus seems to stabilize prenatally; this suggests that he is wedded to the 
promise of a clear and distinct natural homosexual minority. Newsweek’s 
report was advertised with a white baby on the cover and the question, “Is 
This Child Gay?” But the complexity and modesty of the scientific project, 
and the tendency of its conclusions to get lost, or perverted, in the translation 
from scientific journals to the popular press, are not the only problems.21 
 
All 41 brains in LeVay’s study were obtained from people who had died 
from complications associated with AIDS. LeVay assumed that the men in his 
study who reported being infected with HIV through homosexual intercourse 
were homosexual, and that the men who reported that the source of HIV 
transmission was intravenous drugs were heterosexual. The sexual orientations 
of the women did not interest LeVay. Of course, having homosexual sex 
does not mean that someone is or identifies as homosexual: one might have 
been paid for homosexual sex, have had it once as a youth, or have performed it 
secretly while identifying as heterosexual, for instance. Even if the 
deceased had identified themselves as homosexual, though, LeVay cannot 
infer anything about how much homosexual sex they had or desired, or how 
much heterosexual sex they had or desired, which is what he claims the 
INAH-3 size correlates with. LeVay tries to circumvent this problem by 
suggesting that INAH-3 correlates with the direction of either feelings or 
behavior. 
 
Further problems in the attempt to find a biological basis for sexual identities 
arise when modern technology is considered. A woman might get a sex 
change operation and live as a man, having heterosexual sex with women. 
What size might the INAH-3 region of his hypothalamus be? What of variations 
in sexual preference other than object-choice-such as scripted vs. 
nonscripted sex, sex in public vs. sex in private, orgasmic vs. nonorgasmic 
sex, sex with one person vs. more than one (Sedgwick 8)? These variations 
seem not to concern evolutionary theorists precisely because such preferences 
are assumed to be less intrinsic or fundamental to our being than the gender 
of object-choice. That variations in sexual preference that do not revolve 
around sex categories are ignored suggests that evolutionary theorists presume 
and perpetuate a sex binarism that queer theorists and “postmodern” 
feminists have analyzed as central to a disciplinary regime of heterosexuality 
(see Butler; Sedgwick). 
 
Studies like LeVay’s take for granted a sexually desiring agent as their 
subject of analysis. In this framework, INAH-3 would never be hypothesized 
to correlate with, for instance, the genders (or some other features) of those 
people who tend to be attracted to the agent. Instead, it is the subject who is 
thought to have a substance in his brain that directs his desire to specific 
others.22 Halperin (27) has pointed out that many premodern and non- 
Western cultures did not individuate people at the level of sexual preference 
and no more assumed that sexuality was categorizable or innate than modern 
people consider dietary preferences to be. From this vantage point, scientific 
studies looking for links between sexual orientation and biology could be 
questioned not only for their assumption that an individual’s sexuality is 
directed toward a specific gender category but for their assumption that 
individuals have an intrinsic component of their subjectivity that we call 
“sexuality” at all. 
 
Since sexual identifications change across history, cultures, and an individual’s 
life span, any attempt to ground an identity in nature is suspect.23 
Only relatively recently and in the West has a homosexuaVheterosexua1 division 
become such a salient dichotomy for identification (Halperin; Sedgwick). 
In the Mexica/Latin American system, a man’s sexual identity is 
based on a preference for certain acts rather than on the gender of object choice 
(Almaguer). The argument that one could be biologically wired for a 
position in a sexual categorization system that is itself culturally and historically 
constructed arrogantly presumes the universality of particular modern 
and Western identities. 
 
LeVay and other progay essentialists are not only sociologically and scientifically 
undiscerning, but, if hopeful that establishing homosexuality as biologically 
based will protect it, politically short-sighted as well. They and their 
adherents might anticipate that, because the “unnaturalness” of homosexuality 
has been historically used in order to condemn it politically, scientifically establishing 
its “naturalness” may be what convinces homophobes to change 
their views. The attempt to secure gay rights through scientific claims about 
nature, however, contains many pitfalls.24 Not only are the arguments for a 
gay brain” or “gay genes,” however well intended, nonsensical in evolutionary 
terms (there is no reason to assume that human heterosexuality was adaptive), 
and asociological in their insistence that such a historically and culturally 
constructed category for identity could be inborn, but the hope to secure gay 
rights through such an argument, even if successful, has other political problems. 
Namely, it authorizes scientific knowledge to settle political disputes, as 
though it were value-free; reproduces the same foundationalist logic that has 
historically been used against gays;25 ignores other sexual minorities (celibates, 
shoe fetishists, and strappers-on, for example), leaving them in the marginalized 
dust until someone proves that they, too, are born that way; ignores the 
ways in which biology is increasingly dissociated from the unchangeable (think 
of the well-funded Human Genome Project and other technologies for altering 
what was once considered destiny); and, finally, in positioning homosexuality 
as a biological-minority orientation, solidifies rather than dissolves the natural 
and normative status of heterosexuality. 
 
CONCLUSION: LEARNING TO LIVE WITH PERVERSION 
A naturalized heterosexuality is troublesome because it does not innocently 
describe reality but creates it-and the ritual enactments of the evolutionary 
myth of natural manhood (something that, precisely because it is not real or 
natural or automatic, must be relentlessly rehearsed and reestablished) have 
defined and restricted life chances for anyone who is not a ”natural” man. I 
suggest that we approach scientific stories the way queer theorists have approached 
other cultural texts. This involves embracing the instability of 
knowledge and identities, undermining that “organic” feeling straight men, 
however precariously, preserve. Evolutionary stories naturalize heterosexuality 
not because the “facts” of evolution simply force us to accept our soiled 
(heterosexual) animal natures but because an unexamined commitment to the 
privileged, universal status of Western heterosexual masculinity has influenced 
the kind of evolutionary psychologies theorists have imagined and 
projected onto our past.26 Further, the status of scientific knowledge as producer 
of authoritative accounts of the real conceals the politics of naturalizing 
heterosexuality. 
 
I have not questioned the legitimacy of the theory of evolution itself (although 
others, creationists for instance, would), or its specific assumptions 
about natural selection or the genetic basis for sexual predilections. I have 
taken the theory of evolution on its own terms, and constructed a new interpretation 
of sexual behavior based on an alternative set of background assumptions. 
To construe evolutionary theory itself as the enemy of women and 
queers concedes too much to popular cultural assumptions of the evolutionary 
advantage of predatory heterosexual male desire and the stability of 
scientific texts. I have tried to argue that we can use evolutionary theory to 
pull the nature rug out from under straight men’s feet, and to undermine the 
establishment of heterosexism and scientific authoritarianism more generally. 
 
Queer interpretations of cultural texts destabilize straight texts, the apparent 
stability of which many bank on. Queer interpretations are no more 
biased than straight interpretations. No story of the meaning of animal mating 
habits or of human evolutionary history could ever be independent of 
political commitments. Nondominant perspectives can point to new directions 
for research and to new interpretations of nature. The new stories that 
result have different social consequences but are still value-laden stories. 
The belief that some sort of neutral “truth” exists and can arbitrate political 
conflicts is based on the tired old distinction between knowledge and politics 
(see Brown; Smith), one which holds up scientific knowledge as a promising 
foundation for moral meaning, the truth that will set us free. 
 
But scientific accounts of sexuality and mating can never represent the 
world independent of human values. The conventional, objectivist philosophy 
of scientific knowledge, which presupposes a nature “out there” that we can 
describe neutrally, assumes that talking about birds and fish in terms saturated 
with human meanings masks what is going on in nature. In other words, we 
should beware of the panda’s “thumb.” (Stephen Jay Gould tells us that what 
appears to be a sixth digit of the giant panda is not a finger at all but a bit of 
elongated bone.) Feminist critics of sociobiology have condemned the use of 
terms like “rape,” “homosexual,” and “adultery” to describe practices of nonhuman 
animals, arguing that such words in a sociobiological context are “jargon” 
and have “possible social repercussions” and that less emotionally evocative 
terms should be used (Gowaty 630). Such critiques have been important 
for exposing the values in scientific descriptions. But it is time to move beyond 
these critiques, since they too privilege certain stories on epistemological rather 
than political grounds, preserving a distinction between knowledge and politics. 
The stories feminists privilege are not jargon- or metaphor-free, nor are 
they less distorted representations of nature. As Williams notes, feminists have 
not objected to saying that animals practice “courtship,” ”fasting,” and “migration” 
(or “bonding,“ ”friendship,” etc.). And while the use of “forced pair 
copulations” rather than “rape” might sound more technical, such terminology 
does not make scientific stones free of human values or social repercussions; it 
simply does a better job of hiding them. Perhaps we should also beware of the 
mallard’s “forced pair copulations.” 
 
Since scientific stories about animal behavior are inescapably value-laden, 
making values more invisible only enables irresponsible storytelling. I have 
attempted a critique that acknowledges the impossibility of describing nature 
neutrally. Queer interpretations try to make conspicuous the values and political 
commitments that inform them, and promise to undermine dominant 
knowledge regimes without making the same mistake of offering an impossibly 
innocent discourse. Thus, I have engaged evolutionary theory not to reinstitute 
the hegemony of scientific discourse but to undermine it, showing how scientific 
stories, straight and queer, have political bases and political consequences. My 
alternative account of men’s evolved sexual psychology is no less, and no more, 
a ‘just-so story” than heterosexist evolutionary narratives. 
 
Although any strategy for disrupting the dominant sexual system is risky,27 
I am convinced that the strategy that discommodes the method of privilege-legitimation 
is more promising than the strategy that preserves the traditional 
relationships between essentialism and morality. In making Science our 
Bible, the traditional approach forecloses responsible dialogue over political 
commitments and rights for sexual minorities whose deviance does not necessarily 
or exclusively revolve around object-choices of the “wrong” gender. 
The “gay brain” approach, while it promises to mess with the minds of many 
homophobes who have justified their discrimination on biological grounds, 
fails to loosen heterosexuality from its privileged place as natural and inevitable. 
That approach also fails to challenge the position of science as an 
authoritative arbiter of political conflicts. After all, what counts as ‘perversion” 
is a matter of politics, not nature. The attempt to ground homosexuality 
in nature therefore holds less promise than a queer theory approach that 
undermines the naturalized sex binarism, the mythic naturalness of heterosexuality, 
and the authority of science altogether. 
 
Exposing the heterosexist assumptions that have been an implicit part of 
evolutionary theorizing might complicate “innocent” attempts to naturalize 
heterosexuality, and make scientists, feminists, and queers consider new possibilities 
for theorizing. Unfortunately, many, with straight or queer commitments, 
engaged in scientific knowledge production or its critique have not 
challenged the distinction between knowledge and politics. Until they do, 
beware of the heterosexual bug. 
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NOTES 
1. Often representations of heterosexual femininity rely on a neo-Darwinian discourse 
as well. The solidification of a natural femininity appears to be less common in the 
popular press, however, and is probably relatively less necessary politically. Politically 
privileged heterosexual men have a relatively greater need for narratives that legitimate 
their behaviors and privileged positions-both of which have been challenged by 
women’s and lesbigay rights activists, a climate of economic and national decline, and a 
series of public debates about sexual harassment, rape, hate crimes such as gay-
bashing, and gays in the military. Because of the higher political stakes of essentializing 
manhood, these representations are more common as the subject of both evolutionary 
theorizing and commentary in the popular press. Nevertheless, a companion essay that 
perverts evolutionary theories of femininity is underway. 
2. It should be noted, though, that evolutionary theorists themselves are by and large 
more liberal socially and politically than, say, the Catholic Church. Edward Wilson, 
leading proponent of the sociobiology movement, states that the natural-law theory of 
the Catholic Church wrongly assumes that the biological significance of sex is the 
insemination of wives by husbands (141). As I discuss later, Wilson claims that the 
biological function of sexual pleasure in human beings is not insemination but bonding. 
Thus to a large extent it is the cultural context in which these matters get taken up that 
make evolutionary theories into secular extensions of Judeo-Christian heterosexism. 
3. While the Bible has been the more common authoritative version of human nature 
used to settle political disputes, the authority of scientific accounts of human nature now 
competes to replace that of biblical accounts (see McCaughey). 
4. A student of mine recently suggested that feminists are naive for “forgetting” the 
evolutionary basis for men’s sexual violence against women. “C’mon,” he insisted 
confidently, “I saw Quest for Fire”-as though that film’s depiction of humanity’s “cave 
days,” in which men butted up behind women for quick nonconsensual copulations, is 
not imaginary. See Berril and Herek, and Herek, on how ideas of natural manhood 
perpetuate queer bashing, and Stoltenberg on how ideas of natural manhood 
perpetuate rape. 
5. See, e.g., Haraway; Longino; and the essays in Harding and Hintikka; and in Tuana. 
6. See, e.g., Doty; Warner; and the essays in the “Queer Theory’’ issue of differences 
(Summer 1991). 
7. For more examples of the sexual politics of scientific stories, see Haraway on primate 
stories; Longino on sex differences research; and Martin on egg and sperm stories. 
8. See Daly and Wilson. Evolutionary biology provides the conceptual framework within 
which psychological, evolutionary, and genetic developments are logically integrated. 
Sociobiology is “the scientific study of the biological basis of all forms of social behavior 
in all kinds of organisms, including man [sic]” (Wilson 216, 222). 
9. The ideas that evolution had no moral logic, that any old trait could have emerged 
through selective pressure, and that living things were not guided by the divine 
undermined the inclination to ground moral or political claims in some absolute 
framework (specifically Christianity) and was the subject of much worried debate in 
Darwin’s day. See McCaughey for a discussion of the anxieties Darwin’s theory incited 
and how evolution eventually was reworked into a new foundation for political goals. 
10. It should be noted that this popular understanding of “innate” is itself a perversion of 
an evolutionary theorist’s understanding, which is not that a trait will always occur but 
that a trait will always occur in a certain environment (Wilson). 
11. I do not wish to imply, with the filter imagery,’that there is an objective lens behind 
the filter. Uncommonly held assumptions, such as feminist or queer meanings of gender 
and sexuality, are also conceptual filters through which scientific evidence is interpreted. 
12. Although many feminists assume that sociobiologists theorize sexist male behaviors 
as a way to provide biological justifications for the behaviors that feminists have worked 
so hard to condemn, evolutionary theorists adamantly deny this accusation. 
Evolutionary psychologists hold that an evolved tendency is not something that is 
necessarily adaptive now, but was adaptive in the EEA and may now be completely 
inappropriate or even driving us to extinction because it is being played out or practiced 
in an evolutionarily novel environment. Arguments that something is an evolved 
tendency is not an argument that it is good, that it is at present adaptive, or that it 
should be tolerated. Symons notes,  
It is not the business of Darwinism to dash people’s hopes for less suffering and more 
happiness with gloomy pronouncements about the intransigence of human nature. 
Neither the Darwinist nor anyone else can predict the limits of human invention. . . . It is 
the business of Darwinism, however, to emphasize that human inventiveness is made 
possible by the richness and complexity of human nature. A human being has more 
scope than an amoeba has precisely because a human being has more nature than an 
amoeba has. (142)  
Yet the commitment to “discovering” the “nature of man” is not innocent. Indeed, such 
an endeavor establishes the importance of itself more than anything else. The social 
problems wind up as an excuse to engage in the discipline. Studd and Gattiker remind 
readers that they do not mean to imply that women should begin to forgive sexual 
harassers: “It is 
simply our hope that the more we understand about the evolution of human psychology, 
the closer we will be to developing appropriate and effective solutions for such 
unfortunate and deplorable side effects of human nature and behavior as sexual 
harassment” (287). Their solution involves changing “the structure of the organizational 
environment which would reduce the stimulus and opportunity for evolved male sexual 
psychology to motivate the initiation of sexual advances, and allow women more 
freedom to change jobs or change their working environment, as they feel is necessary” 
(287). (Perhaps harassers should be allowed more “freedom” to get fired.) Equal pay is 
not mentioned as a solution, although earlier the authors state that women’s economic 
position relative to men’s makes this male strategy come out (the way, we might say, 
lots of gardening makes calluses come out). They conclude by righteously proclaiming 
that “with the knowledge provided by an understanding of the evolutionary psychology 
of human behavior, we have the opportunity to make a positive contribution toward the 
management of sexual harassment . . .” (287). No doubt this would manage sexual 
harassment rather than end it. 
13. The fact that offices and other modern workplaces did not exist in the EEA might 
mean, for evolutionary theorists, that coercive male sexual behavior in the EEA did 
result in reproductive success, whether or not it does today. However, these theorists 
use the modern workplace as evidence that coercive sexual behavior was rewarded (in 
terms of reproductive success) in the EEA. I am suggesting that what goes on in the 
modern workplace could be taken as evidence for a different hypothesis about the 
behavior that was rewarded in the EEA. 
14. That men do not universally find visibly pregnant women unattractive, even though 
copulating with them is a guaranteed reproductive dead end, is evidence against the 
theory that men have evolved with particularly keen abilities to distinguish between, 
through differential sexual attraction to, fertile and infertile bodies. 
15. Donald Symons furnished this useful observation about sugar in his 1989 seminar 
on human nature at the University of California, Santa Barbara. 
16. As Darwinism emerged as a “threat” to Christian meaning systems, even an 
evolutionary view of heterosexuality was troubling since it implied that heterosexual 
reproduction was a haphazard meeting of sperm and egg (a view that threatened the 
dominant Judeo-Christian understanding). That an evolutionary account of 
heterosexuality is now employed in a way which anchors people’s imagined 
heterosexual essences shows, as I argue elsewhere (McCaughey), how contemporary 
Darwinism has been turned into the cure for the very social anxieties and problems that 
were, a century ago, attributed to Darwin’s theory in the first place. 
17. I do not mean to imply that no scholar has ever argued that humans might be 
bisexual. Certainly Freud and others are well known for just such an assertion (although 
they did not base their arguments on now-current versions of evolutionary theory). My 
point is that evolutionary theorists have not entertained bisexuality as a hypothesis for 
which to provide evolutionary evidence, even though nothing about the theory of 
evolution automatically implies a heterosexual human nature in any individual or in the 
majority of humans. My interest in evolutionary theory, then, derives not from the idea 
that it is the one theory that holds the promise of positing humans as bisexual, but 
rather from the fact that it has so consistently been used in recent years to undermine 
bisexual hypotheses, replacing them with one of innate male heterosexual predation. 
18. This could be because copulation need not be pleasurable to be adaptive, however. 
Recall our poor beheaded male praying mantis; his decapitation could not have been 
selected against if the copulation usually resulted in a fertilization, In any case, 
evolutionary theorists have not offered a story in which our foresisters bonded sexually 
together. 
19. Given Wilson’s terrible reputation among many academics, it is worth noting that his 
claims do not dismiss homosexuals as evolutionary misfits or dysfunctional perverts. 
For instance, Wilson suggests that homosexual men in some of the “more primitive 
cultures” often became shamans, peacemakers, and advisors to tribal leaders, and in 
Western society score higher than heterosexuals on intelligence tests, select white 
collar professions disproportionately, are generally well adapted in social relationships, 
and often enter careers in which they deal directly with other people (146). Wilson also 
remarks that it would be both unfortunate and illogical to make past genetic 
adaptedness a necessary criterion for current acceptance (147). 
20. LeVay is one of several recent studies which have been reported in the media. See 
also Bailey and Pillard; and Hamer and Copeland. My concern here is not to review or 
critique aIl of these studies but rather to point to the ways in which studies that search 
for a biological substratum for homosexual preference, desire, or identity reify a sex 
binarism that is, paradoxically, part and parcel of heterosexism. 
21. Another example of the press’s extending and twisting the modest message of a 
scientificstudy is the National Inquirer’s report of Hamer’s research that suggested a link 
between DNA markers on the X chromosome and male sexual orientation: “Simple 
Injection Will Let Gay Men Turn Straight, Doctors Report” (Hamer and Copeland 18). 
22. The conflation of sexual activity/penetration/agency and heterosexual manhood 
masculinity may account for the frequency with which scientific studies focus on 
explaining men’s sexuality and not women’s (in addition to the reasons already 
mentioned in note 1). In our cultural logic, it is more difficult to imagine women as active, 
desiring sexual subjects whose genetic or biochemical structure explains the direction of 
their amorous attentions. The construction of men as first-class citizens who are active 
sexual agents, and the construction of penetration as an act by which a first-class 
citizen establishes himself as superior to the person being penetrated, means that 
getting penetrated makes one a woman/second-class citizen/fag/degraded. Here it 
should be obvious how sexism and heterosexism work together through the 
construction of the meaning of penetration. To penetrate means, culturally, to degrade-
for men and women-but is thought to be appropriate to do to women, since they lack the 
entitlement to first-class citizenship status. If a man wants to be penetrated, or wants to 
penetrate someone socially deemed impenetrable (i.e., another man), he threatens the 
order by which male privilege is defined and legitimated. See Bersani; and also Halperin 
(30-33) for discussions of these issues. 
23. Hamer remarks that his search for the “gay gene” accounted for an individual who 
may have, say, identified as heterosexual until the age of 21 and then came out as gay. 
His research presumes that a man might change his sexual behavior but not his sexual 
orientation (Hamer and Copeland 65). 
24. See Stein for a more detailed argument that scientific research on sexual orientation 
is irrelevant for advancing the moral and civic entitlement of gay men and lesbians. 
Dean Hamer, of the “gay gene” study, was dismayed when the father of two gay sons 
wrote him to say that Hamer’s work that said homosexuality might be genetic fmally 
allowed him to forgive himself for having gay sons. Hamer explains: He decided to 
forgive his sons because we found a genetic link to homosexuality. But what if the 
experiment had failed? Or what if we gave his family a blood test and found they didn’t 
have the “gay gene,” that the sons were gay for some other reason? Then would this 
father go back to blaming himself for raising two gay sons, and would they be less 
worthy of his love? (Hamer and Copeland 19) 
25. Certainly gay rights lawyers have tried to use, or appeal to, foundationalist logic in 
courts, hoping to secure gay rights by presenting evidence for the naturalness of 
homosexuality. I do not have space in this essay to debate the pros and cons of 
foundationalism, but see Halley for a discussion of the legal strategy and Barbara 
Herrnstein Smith for a discussion of the problems with foundationalism. 
26. These stories deal with femininity relatively infrequently. The construction of man as 
heterosexual predator, though, positions woman as the naturally passive other in this 
heterosexual equation. 
27. See Franklin for a discussion of the way the AIDS epidemic and new reproductive 
technologies could have disrupted the “natural” basis for the nuclear family and 
heterosexual privilege but instead reconsolidated it. 
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